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Disrupt or die thinking doesn’t help The typical approach to defining different levels of innovation tends to polarise things for most employees. With the right-hand side of the scale firmly rooted in the phrase ‘disrupt or die’ means, most people instantly jump to extensive, complex, far-out solutions. Barker Scott, Brenda (2004). “3:
In this post I will explain how the disruptibility curve, described in my previous blog posts, could be used for the same purpose. The disruptibility curve maps a company on two axes: The Natural Monopoly and the Customer responsiveness. If you read my previous posts , you can look away now (or rather skip to the next paragraph).
In this post I will explain how the disruptibility curve, described in my previous blog posts, could be used for the same purpose. The disruptibility curve maps a company on two axes: The Natural Monopoly and the Customer responsiveness. If you read my previous posts , you can look away now (or rather skip to the next paragraph).
It is only natural to consider whether the cohort of CVCs established during the last five years will have more staying power than the dot-com CVC group, many of which closed down during the economic downturn of 2001-2004. Siemens Venture Capital requires business unit commitment around each investment.
It is only natural to consider whether the cohort of CVCs established during the last five years will have more staying power than the dot-com CVC group, many of which closed down during the economic downturn of 2001-2004. Siemens Venture Capital requires business unit commitment around each investment.
It is only natural to consider whether the cohort of CVCs established during the last five years will have more staying power than the dot-com CVC group, many of which closed down during the economic downturn of 2001-2004. Siemens Venture Capital requires business unit commitment around each investment.
HP management conceded that the disruptive impact of the iPad forced their hand but that hand was already quite weak from a decade of over-serving the market. Microsoft was offering Pocket PC and the Phone edition was on the roadmap. By the time their success was worth noticing, in 2004, HP and Dell decided to dabble in devices.
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